Descartes � Second Meditation

@12 on Friday, 22 October 1999

Intro

not whole 2nd med � leave wax until 7th week

2 revolutionary things in Descartes�s thinking:

1.      separated philosophy from theology

2.      establish the autonomy of reason as the highest form of authority � in defiance of the Church and State

this power of reason never goes through the method of doubt

in order to doubt the power of reasoning, you need to use reason (no other tool available) � have already presupposed that reason is possible to cast doubt

it�s at the level of reason that the sceptic his match, because the sceptic himself must be able to understand logical inferences and present logical arguments if they are to convince us of their arguments

The evil demon & the cogito

even if the evil demon who is deceiving me about everything around me (has taken me and presented me with a picture subject to doubt), something must exist to have its memory and perception deceived

- if there is deception, there must be something which is being deceived

what if this thought is the work of the evil demon?

he cannot �/span> that while I am being deceived I am nothing

at that very moment of deception, I know for sure that I am

\ I am, I exist = necessarily true every time I voice it

the method of doubt has cmoe to a half � one certain/indubitable proposition

he argues that it is a simple proposition, not an inferential one

uses a first-person pronoun to refer to that thing of which he has certain � still does not know what that thing is

�what am I?� � what is the self that we postulate?

consider the things previously subject to doubt � bodily characteristics, still subject to doubt

turns to mind: discovers the only attribute which cannot be separated from him � the attribute of thought � not essential, but cannot be separated � I am therefore, in the strict sense only, a thing that thinks (mind, intellect reason etc.)

footnote: very controversial claim � �only a thing that thinks� vs �strict sense only, a thing that thinks� � would be fallacious � (scope)

the famous formulation of the cogito is not found in the Meditations � philosophy important: relation between thinking & existence (cogito vs sum) � regards the relation as being immediate � no inference from one to the other � not inferring existence from thought � �I am thinking� and �I exist� as two propositions bound up together � one is not inferred from the other

Cogito

the mere fact that I am going to doubt that I exist I am thinking

meditator could at least be certain of his own existence

but the cogito has not defeated scepticism � he would not need 4 meds & to prove God

has haunted the method of doubt � showed that there is at least one thing of which the meditator need not doubt

controversy re the cogito�s:

         ground of certainty

         structure or status

         content

cogito = self-evidently true

doesn't need to depend on anything else for its true

= necessarily true every time I utter it or conceive it in my mind

important difference:

if I am thinking, then I necessarily exist

if [I am thinking], then it is necessarily true that [I exist]

necessarily [if I am thinking, then I exist]

Descartes makes the 2nd claim � the first makes the claim that I am a being which necessarily exists, rather than a finite being

how do I know that I am a finite being � because I am doubting � my existence is contingent (there is no contradiction in saying that I might not have existed)

but the cogito cannot be denied at the moment it is being thought � pragmatically self-defeating (not self-contradictory, otherwise it would be necessary � but it does have a peculiar certainty)

3 major objections

How much does the cogito establish

Hobbes: Descartes has not proved, but simply assumed that the �thing that thinks� is the subject to which my reason or intellect belong

has not proved that the subject may not be something physical/corporeal

Descartes: did not assume corporeality but left it until the 6th Meditation

is it not possible just because I do not know anything about them (all these corporeal things) that in reality they are identical with me � I don't know yet

Structure or status of the cogito

simple intution

- Descartes�s own understanding of it

syllogistic inference

a syllogism = major premise, minor premise & conclusion

argument: Descartes has suppressed the first premise, but it can easily be provided

minor: I am thinking

conclusion: I exist

excl: major: all thinking things exist

Descartes: one is recognising something self-evident rather than a syllogism

Williams pg 90: the meditator is in no position to help himself to the inference, because the meditator is not entitled to the 1st premise because the 1st premise is a universal major premise � but the meditator has called everything into doubt so how can he claim it implicitly � but the meditator does not need to know the truth of that implicit major premise because the 2 propositions are bound up and commutative)

so williams rejects the syllogistic criticism

non-syllogistic inference

not syllogistic, but Descartes does require a presupposition � in order to think, it is necessary to exist � this does not permit the meditoator to any existential claims (i.e. re what exists)

the first existential claim that the meditator has made = that he exists

does not tell you whether anything exists

the mistake that the objectors make is the way Descartes arrives at and explains the cogito � in order to explain it to us, he has to put it into argument form � but for him, no inference

i.e. no need for antynig else in rdo

 

distinguish between the way he arrives at it and the way he explains it

it is his explanation that we are objecting to

 

 

performative

Hintikka � modern philosopher � give Descartes another interpretation

the cogito = performative = a speech act, e.g. I promise

but: it makes the fact that I exist dependent on the performance

but what makes me exist is not that I utter the sentence, but that I think

performatives cannot be true/false

but we know the cogito to be true (self-evidently) so how can it be performative)

The irreducibility of I

Georg Lichtenberg � minor 18th century thinker

not entitled to say that �I am thinking� � only that �there is thought� or �there is thinking�

denying the 1st-person formulation of the cogito � putting it in the impersonal formulation

contemporary philosopher Angstrum?? � remorseless attack on the cogito � the word �I� is simply a grammatical illusion � a shadow cast by language � tricks us that there is something to which the �I� refers to (the thing the thinks)

if he says �I am thinking�, he is apparently making a substantial claim � this must be understandable from an objective standpoint

\ if you cannot differentiate yourself from everything else, you cannot use �I� to identify yourself, unless there is an objective standpoint

confusions between what we cliaim to know and what is the case � the fact that the meditator cannot know (because subject to doubt) that there is anythnig ext to him, that it doesn't follow that the proposition cannot be understand from an objective standpoint

what is being asked when the med is sayiung that there is thinking going on

how is eh going to entertain the prposition �there is thought� without him himself entertaining it

in the very thought there is thought, there must be a thinker thinking the thought that there is thought

(williams)

if it were true that he is not entitled to say that I am thining, but only that there is thought, then the penalty = never able to know whether 2 propositions contradict each other or entail anything

unable to think in any way if the objection were correct

1: it is not doubted

2: it is doubted

unless you relativise those 2 propositions to a thinker thinking at the same time, then thre is no way to demonstrate a contradiction

have to bring them together to show a contradiction

have to relative the thought being thought

 

best candidate for relativising = the �I� that is doing the thinking